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Abstract: The increase of oil spill accidents has made significant impacts on life, property and the en-
vironment. Facing ever-increasing risk of disaster losses, how to cope with and response to large scale
oil spill disaster effectively is becoming more and more important. And it is extremely onerous and ar-
duous to develop a highly capable assessment technique to evaluate the effectiveness of emergency re-
sponse system (ERS) for oil spill. An ERS for oil spill is a complex and dynamic system comprising a
number of elements, one of which fails to accomplish its function would result in potential adverse im-
pacts on the whole system. Evaluating the effectiveness of the system requires the consideration of all
failures identified in the system simultaneously. Aims to propose a decision-making framework, this
paper uses failure mode effect and criticality analysis (FMECA) to evaluate the effectiveness of ERS to
make improvements in oil spill emergency management. It is achieved by analysing the components
and bounds of the system, identification of generic failure modes which are considered as key factors of
ERS for oil spill. And lastly a case study is demonstrated to validate the methodology framework.
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1 Introduction
According to the statistics of Clarkson Research Serv-
ices Limited, the total oil tanker fleet is up to 493
million tons by the end of 2012. The development of
vessel traffic increases the occurrence probability of
oil spill, and the significant impacts on local econo-
mies and environment. In April 2010 , the British Pe-
troleam licensed transocean drilling rig deepwater ho-
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rizon sank in the Gulf of Mexico took away eleven
lives and sent over 200 million gallons of oil into the
water (Alijani et a!. 2012). An oil spill disaster of a
pipeline explosion at port of Dalian, north-east of
China, happened in 2010. 1500 tons of oil spilled
from the pipes created 180 km 2 slick in the Yellow
Sea, which grew to 430 km 2 later (The Huffington
Post 2010). The container ship "Cosco Busan"
slammed into a bridge tower in 2007, which was not
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handled effectively because the officials misjudged the
severity of the oil spill, and more than 50000 gallons
of oil spilled in the bay (Fimrite 2007 ) .
Facing ever-increasing risk of disaster losses, how
to cope and deal with large scale oil spill disaster ef-
fectively is becoming more and more important. It is
a system engineering involved in many subsystems
which act as prevention, mitigation, preparation, re-
sponse and recovery. An emergency response system
( ERS) for oil spill is designed to assess, react, and
recover an emergency as quickly and effectively as
possible. It comprises a series of interrelated and in-
terdependent subsystems and activities to complete the
tasks in the ERS for oil spill.
The effectiveness evaluation of ERS for oil spill can
measure the expected objectives achievement, and de-
tect the failures in response. A recent reviews demon-
strate that there are many literatures and research
highlights of the importance of ERS. However, rela-
tive scarcity of the literature on the effectiveness eval-
uation of ERS is emphasized, and the area of ERS for
oil spill is particularly underdeveloped.
Some literatures only focus on the part of the ERS,
which includes coordination between the military and
civilian organizations during emergency (Salmon et
al. 2011), the importance of updating information
during the emergence response (Vivacqua and Borges
2012) , the improvement of the response time to in-
crease the effectiveness of ERS (Mustaffa and Ka-
zunori 2012) , effectiveness of response team features
(Leach and Mayo 2013 ), the effectiveness of train-
ing in organizations ( Winfred et al. 2003), the stake-
holders' perspective of prioritizing oil spill objectives
(Tuler and Webler 2009), and post-incident assess-
ment of environmental contamination and damage
(Kirby and Law 2010). However, the emergency re-
sponse comprises a series of interrelated and interde-
pendent components and activities. The increased per-
formance of single component can't represent for the
increase of the whole system. It is necessary to break
the system into "pieces" to find its failure and poten-
tial causes, but most important is from the system
perspective to analyze how these "pieces" fit together
to reach the goal of the system.
Other literatures highlight the effectiveness of ERS
from the view of system engineering. Abrahamsson et
al. (2010) built a framework to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of ERS and exemplified by a power supply
system; Smith and Clark (2006) used the combina-
tion of Value Focused Thinking (VFT) and BN influ-
ence diagram to model the effectiveness between the
system components, which needed large amount of
precise information to define the prior probability.
Jackson et al. (2010) used FMECA to evaluate the
reliability of ERS and took chlorine release as an ex-
ample based on historic data. It is relative easy to e-
valuate the effectiveness of ERS based on the historic
data. However, the data are usually insufficient for
oil spill, which usually appears randomness and
vagueness with high uncertainty, and some data are
confidential.
Oil spill disaster is considered to be unpredictable
because of number of people involved, short decision
in limited time, unavailability of resources, uncertain-
ty about the situation, pressure and stress involved,
and damage to the sea environment (Vivacqua and
Borges 2012). Consequently, effectiveness evalua-
tion of ERS detected from past accidents provides an
insight of problems might happen in future (Jackson
et al. 2011), no matter the corporation mechanism
running smoothly or not, or how the performance of
emergency manager is (Hockings et al. 2006 ). Uhr
et al. (2005) develops a metric to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of ERS, which includes saving of lives and
property, the efforts of responders to aid casualties,
the response time period, and the safety of the re-
sponse with respect to responders. However, this
metrics is too rough to reflect the ERS operation. The
emergency response process is dynamic and full of
uncertainties. It is, therefore, necessary to analyze
the functions of each component or element, and trace
back their direct and indirect impacts on the final out-
come.
This paper aims to propose a decision-making
framework to evaluate the effectiveness of ERS for oil
spill. Identification failure modes will be done to in-
fluence the effectiveness of ERS. The failure means
activities involved in response process do not com-
plete their functions at a given time of contingency
plan. Based on this, an analytical framework of ef-
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fectiveness of ERS for oil spill is established in sec-
tion 2, FMECA is adapted to define the structure and
boundaries of ERS. The failure modes are identified
to evaluate the subsystems and activities in oil spill e-
mergency response. Risk ranking and results interpre-
tation in ERS for oil spill is in section 3. A case study
to validate the methodology framework is in section 4
and section 5 is the conclusion.
2 Methodology of evaluation
Evaluating the effectiveness of ERS should address
the activities taken in response to underpin their im-
pacts on final outcome. While FMECA is a technique
used to analyse every component in sequence to deter-
mine their effects on the system and to classify each
potential failure mode according to its severity (MIL-
STD-1629A 1980). It was originally developed in
1940s by U. S. Military in MIL-P-1629 and widely
used for military and space application today. FME-
CA includes a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
( FMEA) and Criticality Analysis (CA). FMEA is
used for failure modes identification, the potential
causes and effects. CA is used to compute the proba-
bility of failure modes against the severity of their
consequences. The steps of FMECA process are as
follows.
( a) Define the system and construct a system block
diagram, which is to analyze the overall elements or
components and their functions in operating system,
and demonstrate their interconnection and interde-
pendence among these components.
( b) Identify failure modes of operation system, to
find "what could go wrong" and "why could it go
wrong"; and then list all failure modes, no matter
how few the occurrence is.
( c) Analyze failure occurrence probability. After
identifying the failure modes and its potential causes,
next step is to assess their occurrence probability to
demonstrate their serious extent and priority of pro-
cessing. The probability of failure modes can be esti-
mated from the historical data basically. This brings
difficulties in circumstances when information!past
experience is lack or historical data is confidential.
An estimation method for occurrence probability of
the oil spill emergency failure modes should be ex-
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ploited. The occurrence probability adopted in this
paper is based on failure rate in MIL-STD-1629 A,
1980. Since FMECA is a group decision behavior,
the assessment information for risk factors is mainly
based on experts' subjective judgments (Liu et al.
2001) .
( d) CA. CA is to rank potential failure mode ac-
cording to their severity and occurrence probability
( MIL-STD-1629 A 1980). The Risk Priority Number
(RPN) is to demonstrate the risk of failure mode. It
is a function of occurrence probability, the potential
final effect (severity) and the likelihood of detecting.
The RPN can be illustrated as follow:
RPN = S x 0 x D
where S is the rank of the severity of the failure
mode; 0 is the rank of the occurrence of the failure
mode; D is the rank of the likelihood of the failure
detected.
The smaller RPN value the better, the larger the
worse.
3 Establishing effectiveness evaluation
model of ERS for oil spill
3.1 Defining structure and bounds of ERS for oil
spill
According to analytical methodology to evaluate the
effectiveness of ERS for oil spill, the first step is to
define the bounds and functions of ERS for oil spill.
Establishing a diagram describing the interrelationship
and interdependent among various parts is premier in
identifying failure modes in ERS for oil spill.
3.1.1 The structure of the ERS for oil spill
( 1) Notification. While oil spill occurs, staff on site
should report the information to related organization.
The information should include causes of oil spill, lo-
cation, estimated amount of oil spill and descriptions,
actions have been taken, weather condition, etc. The
site scene information is the basis of seriousness eval-
uating and decision-making.
(2) Evaluation. After receiving the information of
oil spill, the slick trajectory should be modelled based
on oil sources, wind and currents and predicted ac-
cording to weather forecast, and the threats evaluation
to some sensitive areas. The evaluation of oil spill
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should through the whole response.
(3) Initiation: while receiving the oil spill report,
the corresponding response tier should be initiated ac-
cording to contingency plan, to build a response or-
ganization formed by relative organizations or other
plan holders to direct the emergency response works
accordingly. The key member leadership should be
designated. Subsequently, based on the modelling of
oil spill trajectory, the response decisions required
should be made without hesitation and delay in the
light of threats.
( 4) Mobilization and clean-up. In this stage, the
main work is to determine the available resources, de-
ploy resources and ensure the sufficient resources lo-
gistics support in accordance with decision made by
the response organization. The critical resources de-
ployment and delivery are crucial parts in the period
of emergency response. They support and implement
through the whole response process, which comprises
personnel and teams, physics materials, equipment,
facilities and suitable response techniques.
( 5) Review progress. It is mainly to ensure re-
evaluation through process to identify the oil spill situ-
ation under or out of control, which would highlight
the response tier and resources scale up or down.
(6) Termination and plan view. While the oil spill
accident is under control after evaluation, some after-
action work should be processed. A review of the re-
sponse should establish.
3.1.2 The diagram of the ERS for oil spill
The components in the process of oil spill are not sep-
arated, but interdependent and interrelated. Although
each component in ERS for oil spill can afford their
own function, any activity, such as oil spill informa-
tion, initial evaluation, or decision-making would im-
pact on other activities. Taking manage resources as
example, it needs organizing local resources and dis-
patch from other locations. And the number and cate-
gories of physics material, equipment needed or tech-
nique chosen should be managed and organized based
on the decision made by emergency response organi-
zation. The decision-making rely on the initial evalu-
ation and assessment of resources needed by on-site
responder further. Therefore, the stages or compo-
nents in the ERS are interdependent and interrelated.
The diagram is proposed to demonstrate the compo-
nents interrelated and interdependent in ERS for oil
spill (Fig. 1 ) .
3.2 The failure modes identification and effect
analysis in ERS for oil spill
The second phase is to identify the failure modes in
ERS for oil spill. Failure mode can be defined as "the
observable manners in which the component fails"
(Charlies 1997). As a result, identifying failure
modes of ERS for oil spill is required to break the sys-
tem into "pieces" to capture every possible failure ac-
tivity, no matter how minor probability it is.
Response
mobilization-
scale up or
down
h=====;i~ Sufficient
logistics
support
Oil spill
resources
~------i demobilize,
'-----__-----' cI ean
Fig. 1 Interrelated and interdependent of components in ERS for oil spill
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The failure modes can be divided into two main
classes, (1) response-termination failures, which
would stop a response operation entirely, for exam-
pIe, the rescue and response cannot be started owing
to extremely bad weather; (2) capability-reduction
failures, which make a response operation less effec-
tive but do not halt response (Jackson et al. 2010).
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Most responses are attributed to the latter.
In oil spill emergencies, risk becomes dynamic.
New risks emerge, previously recognised risks recede
and the balance among risks changes continuously.
Active risk assessment and management are on-going
processes. The generic 17 identified failure modes can
be seen in Tab. 1.
Tab. I RPN results of generic failure modes
Failure modes
Response communication channel or platform suffer from transmitting breakdown
Information share in the involved organizations incomplete
Decision-making delayed
Key member of leadership incompetent
Oil spill monitoring system fail
Lack of training of responder
Improper measures taken at the initial stage of response
Response resources are unavailable at the initial stage of response
Low coordination between the involved organizations
Crucial resources dispatch and deployment are delayed
No detailed map of sensitive water areas
Initial evaluation fails
Response team are insufficient
Improper technique to be chosen
Incomplete records of activities and cost
No corresponding waste oil treatment
Supplies that were assumed to be at the site had been used and not replaced
RPN
43.70
47.70
265.70
140.80
101. 45
288.75
165.20
118.10
238.50
201.50
8.30
239.20
2·D.1O
113. XO
34.30
19.50
84.30
Failure occurr in every component during response
due to the dynamic and high uncertainty. One failure
may bring about" knock-on" effect and the potential
causes may be diversified. For example, while the in-
formation of the oil spill is incomplete or lack of
guide to direct evaluating the extent of seriousness,
this failure would result in incorrect initial evaluation.
No matter the initial evaluation is underestimated or o-
verestimated the oil spill situation on spot, the initiate
response tier and subsequent stages would be affect-
ed. The potential causes leading to this failure mode
may be the first responder not supplying detailed in-
formation due to lack of knowledge or experience, or
no special communication route access to the relative
organization. And lastly may be caused by extremely
bad weather. As a result, the failure modes are iden-
tified, the potential causes and effect resulted by the
failure mode should be analyzed simultaneously.
3.3 Analysis of the occurrence probability and se-
verity of failure modes
The analysis of occurrence probability and severity
might be based on the historical data of past respon-
ses, or elicited from subjective experts. But the docu-
mented records during the response process are usual-
ly scarce and incomplete at present. The available da-
ta for quantitative analysis is scarce or far from ideal
format. So it is somewhat difficult to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of response. Therefore, the probability of
occurrence in ERS for oil spill usually relies on do-
main experts (e. g. Delphi) to judge the possibility
of occurrence and effect on the final outcome accord-
ing to their experience and knowledgeable. In this
section, five experts are chosen to investigate the ge-
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6 7 7
7 6 6
6 7 6
6 7 6
Tab.2 Probabilities of occurrence and severity of generic failure modes
Failure Potential cause Weighting
Item function Potential effect of failure
modes of failure factor
Initiate response; Ded sion-making Initiation delay; Weighing the 0.10
Identify response, delayed Mobilization delay and crucial potential 0.25
team members, resources are incapable of benefits of the 0.30
their responsibilities delivering and deploying in intervention 0.15
and contact details; time; against possible 020
Make the response Insufficient logistics support; collateral harm;
decisions required No detailed and
in the light of complete
threats; information;
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neric failure modes of ERS for oil spill response. The
weighting factor is assigned to each expert based on
their experience, acknowledge and reputation, which
is O. 10, O. 25, O. 30, O. 15, O. 20 respectively. The
questionnaire is designed to include a potential generic
failure mode in ERS for oil spill response, and an-
swered according to the scale in MIL-STD-1629 A
1980. The results can be seen in Tabs. 1 , 2.
From the RPN results in Tab. 1, it can be seen that
the failure modes, such as .. crucial resources dispatch
and deployment are delayed", "low coordination
among the involved organizations" and "initial evalu-
ation fails" , are of the highest likelihood of failures in
response process. The" lack of training responder" ,
"decision-making delayed", "response team are in-
sufficient", and "low coordination among the in-
volved organizations" are related with person in-
volved. This demonstrates the human errors are the
main causes of failure modes in response. Mean-
while, resources and information are other area result-
ings in failure. During response, the person,
resources and information are three crucial parts
through the" whole life of the response". If any of
them fails, not only affects their functions. but also
has an impact on other activities. For example,
.. initial evaluation fails" means the organization
does not get enough information of oil spill on
spot. It would delay decision making or initiate im-
proper response tier, and then make an impact on
the dispatch and deployment of the emergency
resources. The effectiveness of the ERS would be
influenced in the end.
4 Experimental case study
Suppose there is a port named S alongside "Bohai" in
China. An oil tanker with capacity of 2000 tons crude
oil is aground in a water area nearby port S, from
which approximately 10 tons crude oil leak into the
sea. The weather condition is good. There is no harm
on crew and the crew on board have taken actions to
stop oil leakage further. The related organization re-
ceives the oil spill report, a responder team is con-
structed, and the corresponding response tier is star-
ted. The information about the oil spill is completed
and the initial evaluation is appropriate. The point is
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that the local resources inventory is equipped to deal
with less than 5 tons oil spill. The resources manage-
ment should adopt .• local + aid" modes which is co-
ordinated with the neighboring emergency resources
inventory. The outcome of this oil spill response is
that the time to response oil spill is 12 hours longer
than expected, which would result in the oil spill pol-
lution area expanding.
1) Define the system and construct system block
diagrams. In order to simplify the case, three compo-
nents in the ERS are involved, initiation, mobiliza-
tion and clean-up support. These three components
are interdependent and interrelated with other compo-
nents in ERS for oil spill shown in Fig. 1. The initia-
tion component functions as starting the response ac-
tivities on the basis of the evaluation results and man-
aging resources; the mobilization as a support func-
tion in charge of managing resources from local emer-
gency resources inventory and coordination from other
location according to the decision made by the related
organizations; the clean-up support completes the re-
sources transported and delivers to the designated lo-
cation in a given time to ensure the necessary re-
sources support and avoid logistics disruption.
2) Identify the failure modes and their root causes
in this response process. Focusing on three compo-
nents of initiation. mobilization and clean-up support,
the identified failure modes and potential causes are as
followings.
( 1) Poor coordination among the organizations in-
volved in response hinders effective functioning of the
accident command (Jackson et al. 2011), which
would impact on establishing emergency response
team, site scene response organization, and managing
resources integrity and deployment; (2) The re-
sources are delayed to designated area; (3) Captain
on rescue ship is on holiday resulting in the disruption
of resources delivery; (4) Logistics support from the
neighboring emergency resources warehouse is de-
layed by poor coordinations; (5) The activities and
related records are incomplete which results in the un-
clear of resources inventory and the duty chain is not
clear in the contingency plan; (6) The receiving
waste oil vessels are insufficient because there is no
special waste oil vessel and the contracted vessel did
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not arrive in time. framework t the probability of occurrence and severity
3) Evaluate the possibility of occurrence and sever- are adopted to subjective-matter expert questionnaire
ity of failure modes. According to the analytical to judge the scale of failure modes (Tab. 3) .
Tab. 3 Probability of occurrence and severity of failure modes
Failure modes
Risk factors FMECA experts
Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3 Mode 4 Mode 5 Mode 6
Expert A (0.10) 7 7 2 5 9 7
Expert B (0.25) 4 7 3 8 8 7
Occurrence Expert C (0.30) 5 6 4 5 8 7
Expert D (0.15) 8 4 4 6 9 8
Expert E (0.20) 4 4 2 4 9 5
Expert A (0.10) 6 9 7 6 3 5
Expert B (0.25) 6 6 7 6 3 4
Severity Expert C (0.30) 6 6 7 6 4 5
Expert D (0.15) 7 8 6 6 2 6
Expert E (0.20) 6 6 9 7 4 6
Expert A (0.10) 6 5 3 6 3 3
Expert B (0.25) 7 6 4 7 3 4
Detection Expert C (0.30) 5 6 5 5 3 4
Expert D (0.15) 4 6 5 7 4 5
Expert E (0.20) 5 6 5 4 3 4
RPN 169.8 216.9 103.2 227.1 87.3 140.5
5 Conclusions
From the analysis of failure modes in ERS for oil
spill t response effectiveness evaluation shows that the
personnel, resources capacity and response coordina~
tion mechanism are extremely easy to fail and are vital
to effective response. As far as the personnel in the
response is concerned, two main aspects are in-
volved t one is the key member with rich experiences
in dealing with large-scale oil spill accidents, knowl-
edgeable and high ability to corporation and coordina-
tion. The other is the response team with sufficient
skilled and trained responders. The structure of re-
sponder is referred to percentage of the skilled,
trained employees to others. The higher the percent-
age of the skilled and trained employee, the lower the
percentage the responder risk themselves, the higher
the response effectiveness and efficiency.
Another is the resource t which is the key support in
the process of response, mainly referred to capability.
From the analysis of the generic failure modes and
case study, it can be concluded that the location of
emergency resources, vehicles to collect resources to
designated location, vessels to transport resources
needed and receive collected waste oil should be e-
quipped more than necessity to ensure enough capabil-
ity to reduce the risk of failure and disruption and to
increase response effectively; the records of activities
are necessary because it would support the related in-
formation throughout the whole response process t
which can be functioned as (1) the whole response
process to clarify the deficiencies to be improved in the
contingency plan; (2) historical data as an evidence to
evaluate after action; (3) the resources consumption
and as a reference to manage resources to ensure suffi-
cient logistics support during the response process.
The most important aspect but not the last in ERS
for oil spill is corporation and coordination mecha-
nism. Large scale oil spill accident response is related
with many organizations. Information share and cor-
poration are the premier of response timely. As a re-
suit, the clarified responsibility chain should be ad-
dressed in the contingency plan.
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